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FOREIGN STUDENTS v. NATIONAL SECURITY: WILL
DENYING EDUCATION PREVENT TERRORISM?
Of all the civil rights for which the world has struggled and
fought for 5,000 years, the right to learn is undoubtedly the most
fundamental... The freedom to learn. . has been bought by
bitter sacrifice. And whatever we may think of the curtailment of
other civil rights, we should fight to the last ditch to keep open the
right to learn, the right to have examined in our schools not only
what we believe, but what we do not believe; not only what our
leaders say, but what the leaders of other groups and nations,
and the leaders of other centuries have said.
-WE.B. DuBois
I. INTRODUCTION
The events of September l1th, 20011 opened America's eyes to
many things, including the alarming fact that terrorists live, work, and
1. See Serge Schmemann, U.S. Attacked; President Vows to Exact Punishment for 'Evil,'
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at Al.
During the morning of September 11, 2001, four commercial airplanes
were hijacked by terrorists armed with knives and box cutters. Two of the
jetliners rammed into each of New York's World Trade Center towers, the
third jetliner crashed into the Pentagon. The passengers on the fourth
plane, which was also headed for a target in Washington D.C., raised a riot
and the planed crashed near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Both of the towers
in New York City toppled in a storm of ash, glass, and smoke. In all, 266
people perished in the four planes and thousands died in the three
buildings.
Within an hour of the attacks, the United States was on a war footing.
The military was put on the highest state of alert, National Guard units were
called out in Washington and New York and two aircraft carriers were dis-
patched to New York harbor. President Bush remained aloft in Air Force
One, following a secretive route, while his wife and daughters were evacu-
ated to a secure, unidentified location.
The repercussions of the attacks swiftly spread across the nation. Air
traffic across the United States was halted and international flights were
diverted to Canada. Borders with Canada and Mexico were closed. Federal
buildings across the country were shut down. Major skyscrapers, Disney
theme parks, the Golden Gate Bridge, and United Nations headquarters in
New York, were evacuated. New York, the financial capital of the world, was
closed down. Thousands of workers, released from their offices in Lower
Manhattan but with no way to get home except by foot, set off in vast
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study here, waiting for orders to strike, and there may be no way to
completely eradicate the existing threat. Since September 11th, one
thing has become apparent: there is now heightened distrust of for-
eigners. However, prior to September 11 th, the most notorious domes-
tic terrorists were United States citizens. 2 The September 11th attacks
will make it extremely hard for all foreigners, not just the ones from
terrorism-supporting Middle East countries, which are already "red
flagged," to claim a piece of the "American Dream."3 This will result in
far fewer visas for the millions who come each year to the U.S. to study,
work or visit.4
This country has always been a melting pot, especially welcoming
immigrants from those nations with governments that violate civil
fights, are repressive, and even torture and murder their own citizens
in the name of religion or political loyalties. 5 U.S. is a tolerant nation
and its policies reflect that.6 That is all true unless something goes
wrong and fingers start pointing. 7 Following the September 11 th trag-
edy, because one of the hijackers came to the U.S. on a student visa,
some of those fingers pointed at foreigners, specifically foreign
students.8
streams, down the avenues and across the bridges. The area around the
World Trade Center resembled a desert after a terrible sandstorm. Parts of
building, crushed vehicles, and the shoes, purses, umbrellas and baby car-
riages of those who fled lay covered with thick, gray ash, through which
weeping people wandered in search of safety, each with a story of pure
horror.
2. Ted Kaczynski, the "Unabomber" killed three people and injured 29 others,
working alone in a Montana shack with homemade explosives. Subsequently, Timothy
McVeigh blew up 168 people with 'nothing fancier than a truck filled with chemical
fertilizer'. See Michael Fumento, Anthrax Anxiety, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, Oct. 15,
2001.
3. See Maggie Mzamara, Newsline America: American Dream Now Hard for Foreigners,
THE FINANCIAL GAZETrE, Nov. 1, 2001.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. Hani Hanjour was one of the suicide pilots of American Airline Flight 77
which crashed into the Pentagon. He had entered the country on a student visa and
enrolled at an Oakland, California college in November 2000 for an English language
course, but had failed to show up. Officials estimate that 245,000 foreign students have
entered the United States this year (2001) to pursue a course of study. Between 1999
and 2000, the State Department issued 3,370 visas to students from nations on the
United States' terrorism watch list. See Senator Feinstein Urges Major Changes in U.S. Stu-
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International students make great sacrifices to come to the U.S.9
They leave their homes and often their families, including spouses and
children, to seek a better education in the U.S.; visa regulations do not
allow dependents of students to accompany them.10 The quality of ed-
ucational institutions in the United States draws students from all over
the world. These students should now be prepared for strict and intru-
sive government monitoring of student movements once they arrive in
the "land of the free." 11
This Note discusses the problems posed by Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service's ("INS") implementation of the Student Exchange
Visitor Information System ("SEVIS"), which will monitor foreign stu-
dents throughout their stay in the United States. Part II of this Note
illustrates how foreigners have been discriminated against throughout
history and how SEVIS will monitor foreign students and exchange visi-
tors. Part III of this Note will explain why even though SEVIS is not
unconstitutional, its implementation is bad policy and is not an effec-
tive tool for fighting terrorism. Furthermore, this section will illustrate
that the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act ("FERPA") should
apply to foreign students and offer them the same protection it does
for U.S. students. Part IV will prove that because diversity is needed
and sought by U.S. universities, it is a compelling governmental inter-
est. Finally, this note concludes by describing the dangerous effects
that SEVIS will have on the United States' educational system.
II. MONITORING OF FOREIGN STUDENTS AND DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST FOREIGNERS
A. INS Implements Monitoring Software
In response to growing international terrorism and to ensure the
integrity of the U.S. immigration system, the Illegal Immigration Re-
form and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA") was passed in
dent Visa Program (Sept. 27, 2001), at http://www.senate.gov/%7Efeinstein/releasesOl/
stvisasl.htm. See also Schmemann, supra note 1.
9. See Tracking International Students in Higher Education - Policy Opinions and Impli-
cations for Students Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Select Education and the Subcomm. on
21t Century Competitiveness of the Comm. on Education and the Workplace, 107th Cong. 1st
Sess. 64-67 (2001) [hereinafter Tracking Int'l Students] (testimony of Julia Beatty, Presi-
dent, U.S. Student Association), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.
cgi?dbname= 107_househearings&docid=f" 80215.pdf
10. See id.
11. See id.
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1996.12 Section 641 (c) of IIRIRA directed the INS to establish a nation-
wide electronic system to collect information relating to all foreign stu-
dents and exchange program participants.' The impetus for this
legislation was an allegation that a terrorist involved in the 1993 bomb-
ing of the World Trade Center had originally entered the United
States on a student visa. 14 A 1994 memo to the Department of Justice
(DOJ) from FBI Director Louis Freeh, outlined a perceived risk of ter-
rorism in the United States.' 5 The memo said that one potential
source of terrorists is "those who enter on student visas and do not
abide by their terms." 16 The INS determined that institutions' report-
ing procedures and systems in place were no longer sufficient to ade-
quately provide the information necessary or the quality of service
required to efficiently and effectively manage the programs adminis-
tering non-immigrants using F, M, orJ visas. 17 Mechanisms for tracking
when and how people leave this country were virtually nonexistent. 18 If
people leave by plane, sometimes the airlines pass that information on
to the government; sometimes they do not.19 Furthermore, section
641 (c) of IIRIRA, requires all post-secondary schools and exchange vis-
itor programs to provide information on nationals of all countries by
12. See Press Release, Teachers of English of Speakers of Speakers of Other Lan-
guages (TESOL), TESOL Joins Battle In Opposing CIPRIS (May 29, 2001), at http://
www.tesol.org/assoc/articles/0105-cipris.html (explaining the reason for implementing
IIRIRA).
13. See Illegal Immigration Reform And Immigrant Responsibility Act § 641(c)
(1996). See also NAFSA: Association of International Educators Public Policy and Gov-
ernment Relations Department, NAFSA Urges Congress To Repeal Section 641 Of JIRIRA, at
http://www.nafsa.org//content/PublicPolicy/NAFSAonthelssues/CIPRIS issuebrief.
pdf (accessed Oct. 27, 2001).
14. Ed Timms & Jayne Noble Suhler, Security Worries Putting Spotlight on Student
Visas; U.S. Wants Better Monitoring, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 20, 1998, at 1A
(showing that Eyad Ismoil, who was convicted of driving the explosive-laden van in the
1993 World Trade Center bombing, entered the United States on a student visa).
15. See AndrewJ. Prazuch, The 1996 Immigration Act: Foreign Students and Scholars,
74 No. 10 INTERPRETER RELEASES 453, 454 (1997).
16. See id.
17. See Student And Exchange Visitor Program, at http://www.sevp.net/sev-
program.htm (accessed Nov. 2, 2001) (detailing the ineffectiveness of institutions' re-
porting procedures).
18. See Evan P. Schultz, Is Open Immigration Now Part of Our Past?, LEGAL TIMES,
Nov. 12, 2001, at 50.
19. See id.
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January 1, 2003.20 However, the target date for releasing the web-inter-
active part of the system is July 1, 2002.21
The SEVIS (formerly CIPRIS2 2 ) program is a reengineered stu-
dent and exchange visitor process designed to track international stu-
dents and exchange visitors who are present in the U.S. in F, M, and J
status.23 The INS hopes to convert what is currently a manual proce-
dure into an automated process. 24 This manual procedure is extraordi-
narily complicated, very paper-intensive and very, very slow.
25
According to the INS, this change is expected to improve data collec-
tion and reporting, enhance customer service, facilitate compliance
with regulations, and help the INS better monitor school and ex-
change programs. 26 The development of SEVIS to date has been done
in partnership with the INS, the Department of State (DOS), Consular
Affairs Office and Exchange Visitor Program (formerly USIA), the De-
partment of Education (DOEd), and school and exchange visitor
experts. 27
SEVIS is an internet-based system that allows undergraduate and
graduate institutions to electronically file information about the status
20. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act § 641 (c)
(1996).
21. See SEVIS Implementation Update (Feb. 4, 2002), at http://www.nafsa.org/con-
tent/ ProfessionalandEducationalResources/ImmigrationAdvisionResources/
sevpupdate2.htm (standing for, Student Exchange Visitor Informaiton System) [herein-
after SEWS].
22. CIPRIS was the name assigned to the now-completed pilot project, which
tested the concepts, associated with new data collection and reporting methods. Utiliz-
ing the lessons learned from the pilot, the INS is currently in the process of nationally
implementing the student/exchange visitor data collection and reporting system. The
SEVIS refers to this new national program, which replaces CIPRIS. See INS, SEVP-
Frequently Asked Questions Student Exchange Visitor Program, at http://w-vw.ins.usdoj.gov/
graphics/services/tempbenefits/SEVPqa.htm [hereinafter SEVP] (accessed Nov. 2,
2001).
23. See INS, The Coordinated Interagency Partnership Regulating International Students
(CIPRIS), at http://www.ins.udoj.gov/graphics/services/cipris/nafsa20O.htm [hereinaf-
ter Coordinated Interagency Partnership] (revised Nov. 2000).
24. See id.
25. See Dan Eggen & Cheryl W. Thompson, Hijackers Visa Fiasco Points Up INS Woes;
System Fails So Often it's Not Even Expected to Work, Immigration Experts Say, WASHINGTON
POST, Mar. 17, 2002, at A20 (quoting Terry Hartle, senior vice president at the Ameri-
can Council on Education).
26. See SEVP, supra note 22 (indicating the goals of the program).
27. See Coordinated Interagency Partnership, supra note 23 (illustrating the driving
forces behind the program).
20031
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of their foreign students directly to the INS. 28 Schools and exchange
visitor programs already collect student and exchange visitor data to
comply with the existing Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), particu-
larly 8 C.F.R. § 214.3(g). 29 However, section 641(c) of IIRIRA man-
dates that the INS establish electronic reporting of this data, wherever
feasible.3 0 Thus, SEVIS will automate the manual data collection pro-
cess that schools and exchange visitor programs are already utilizing to
gather information on their students, scholars, and exchange visitors.3'
Furthermore, Congress mandates that this program be self-fund-
ing, and section 641 (e) of IIRIRA gives INS the delegated authority to
determine a fee to be paid by international students and exchange visi-
tors.3 2 The fees are to be collected when the student or scholar first
registers, enrolls, or transfers into a program of study at an institu-
tion.33 After setting the proposed fee at $95, INS received over 4,000
comments to the proposed regulation, with the most frequently cited
concern being the language in section 641(e) of IIRIRA, 34 which re-
quired that an approved institution of higher education and a desig-
nated exchange visitor program collect and remit the fee to the
28. See Scientific Freedom & National Security, The National Commission on Terrorism
Report: Impact on Foreign Students and Minorities, at http://www.aaas.org/spp/scifree/
agenda.htm [hereinafter Scientific Freedom & National Security] (accessed Oct. 26, 2001)
(explaining the way the program will work).
29. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.3(g) (2) (1983).
The designated school official must make the information and documents
required by this paragraph available to and furnish them to any Service
officer upon request. The information and documents which the school
must keep on each student are as follows: (i) Name; (ii) Date and place of
birth; (iii) Country of citizenship; (iv) Address; (v) Status, i.e., full-time or
part-time; (vi) Date of commencement of studies; (vii) Degree program
and field of study; (viii) Whether the student has been certified for practi-
cal training, and the beginning and end dates of certification; (ix) Termi-
nation date and reason, if known; (x) The number of credits completed
each semester; (xi) A photocopy of the student's 1-20 ID Copy.
30. See SEVP, supra note 22 (demonstrating the mandates of section 641 (c) of
IIRIRA).
31. See SEVP, supra note 22 (illustrating the collection process).
32. See Illegal Immigration Reform And Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)
§ 641(e) (1996). See also SEVP, supra note 22 (explaining the funding for the
program).
33. See CIPRIS, Foreign Student Fee Collection System Issue Summary, at http://www.ace
net.edu/washington/letters/2000/01january/cipris summary.html (accessed Jan. 10,
2000).
34. See SEVP, supra note 22 (showing concern for the proposed fee).
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Attorney General.15 In response, the INS worked with Congress and
the DOS to introduce legislation, which transferred the fee collection
responsibility from host schools and exchange programs to the INS. 36
This legislation was attached to The Visa Waiver Permanent Program
Act, and was signed into law by President Clinton on October 30,
2000.37 The INS is currently in the process of finalizing an interim fee
rule.3 8
Pursuant to the INS proposal, there will be two ways for foreign
students to pay the fee required for the visa.3 9 The first is to pay over
the Internet using a credit or debit card.40 The second way is for appli-
cants who lack access to the Internet or a credit card. 4' These appli-
cants may pay in U.S. currency by check or money order using regular
mail delivery, requiring several weeks to obtain confirmation or pay-
ment receipt. 42 The students will not be able to start their education
programs until they receive such confirmation or payment receipt,
which by INS's own estimates will take several weeks.
43
Since 1993, the INS has manually collected information on for-
eign students as mandated by 8 C.F.R. § 2 14 .3(g)( 2 ).4 4 SEVIS was in-
troduced partly to ease the processing of information that was already
backlogged at INS offices. 45 INS wanted SEVIS to provide it with infor-
mation relating to student visas, specifically the dates that visas expire
or dates that students no longer attend an institution, thus, terminat-
ing their student visas.46 INS officials estimate that 40 to 50 percent of
35. See SEVP, supra note 22 (describing prior section 641 (e) of IIRIRA).
36. See CIPRIS Program Update: INS Will Collect F/M/J Fee Beginning in 2001, at http:/
/www.shusterman.com/cipris-dos.html (accessed Oct. 26, 2001).
37. See id.; See also Pub. L. No. 106-396 (2000).
38. See SEVP, supra note 22 (explaining the current state of the fee rule).
39. See Letter from Terry W. Hartle, Senior Vice President, American Council on
Education, to Kevin D. Rooney, Acting Commissioner of INS (April 4, 2001), available at
http://www.acenet.edu/washington/letters/2001/O4april/cipris.html [hereinafter
Letter to INS].
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See Nara Frost, INS Can Monitor Foreign Students, BAYLOR UNIVERSITv WIRE, Oct.
3, 2001.
45. See Kate Zernike & Christopher Drew, A Nation Challenged: Student Visas; Efforts
to Track Foreign Students are Said to Lag, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2002, at Al.
46. See id.
20031
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all illegal immigrants in the country have overstayed their visas. 4 7 How-
ever, INS has not been processing the information that has been sup-
plied to it by the institutions. 48 It is an undisputed fact that once in the
country, there is little, if any, communication between educational in-
stitutions and the United States government about the whereabouts
and activities of most foreign students.
49
B. The Federal Government Has Routinely Discriminated Against Foreign
Students and Non-citizens
In the land that proudly proclaims its immigrant heritage, the Su-
preme Court, over the years, has consistently allowed Congress and the
executive branch of the federal government the right to admit, ex-
clude, or banish non-citizens on any basis they chose including race,
sex, and ideology.50 As Justice Paul Stevens put it in 1976, "in the exer-
cise of its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress
regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citi-
zens." 5 1 Although virtually any regulations with regard to immigrants
and aliens have been tolerated if made by the federal government, sim-
ilar activities by state governments have been carefully scrutinized, and
frequently rejected, by different majorities of the Supreme Court.52
According to current standards of constitutional analysis, govern-
mental classifications which discriminate and make certain distinctions
on the basis of national origin are subject to the strict standard ofjudi-
cial scrutiny imposed by the equal protection clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 53 However, during the Iranian crisis, the
47. See Sandra Peddie & Eden Laikin, Entrance-Exit Trackers, Database for Student
Visas are Back in Favor, THE SEAYTLE TIMES, Oct. 18, 2001, at A3.
48. See Zernike & Drew, supra note 45.
49. See Timme & Suhler, supra note 14 (illustrating the lack of communication
between institutions and the government).
50. See infra notes 57-71 and accompanying text.
51. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976).
52. See Leonard Dinnerstein, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Aliens, at http://
www.apsanet.rg/CENnet/thisconstitution/dinnerstein.cfm (accessed Nov. 17, 2001).
53. Prior to 1938, the Supreme Court upheld discriminatory classifications against
challenges to the equal protection clause as long as they met the criteria of minimum
rationality. See, e.g., Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32 (1928); F.S.
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920); Southern Ry. v. Greene, 216 U.S.
400 (1910); Gulf, Colo. & S.F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897). Upon review of socioeco-
nomic regulations, the Court determined that government restrictions that differenti-
ate people based on national origin need only have a reasonable and nonarbitrary basis
in order to survive judicial review. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-
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United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
upheld a discriminatory law directed at a political minority of specific
national origin under a minimum rationality standard of review. 5 4
Aliens in the U.S. have received discriminatory treatment during
periods of economic depression and political unrest.-5 5 The restrictions
placed on Iranian Students were a direct result of diplomatic politics. 56
79 (1911). Under the standard of minimum rationality, a discriminatory action will be
invalidated only if it rests "on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the
State's objective" or if it is unsupported by "any state of facts [that] reasonably may be
conceived to justify it." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-426 (1961).
The Supreme Court first acknowledged a second level of equal protection analysis
in 1938. In United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), the Court said that
discrimination against "discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition,
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to
be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry." This strict scrutiny standard is set off whenever discrimina-
tion is directed against a 'suspect class' or when fundamental rights are abridged. Kore-
matsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). Since the first address of the 'suspect
class' theory, the Court has further defined the criteria that characterize a 'suspect
class'. While one of the factors is political underrepresentation, the Court also looks
carefully at classifications which are based on "an immutable characteristic determined
solely by the accident of birth," Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973), or
which affect groups that have been "subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treat-
ment." San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). Pursuant
to the strict scrutiny standard, the government must make a dual showing. First, a com-
pelling state interest. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Oyama v. Califor-
nia, 332 U.S. 633, 640 (1948). Second, the use of the classification must be necessary to
the accomplishment of the state interest. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
The Supreme Court has also indicated that a third level of review, intermediate
scrutiny, may be applicable to equal protection challenges when the rights affected are
important in nature but not deemed fundamental, or when sensitive, though not sus-
pect, criteria are used as a basis for a discriminatory classification. Intermediate review
utilizes a number ofjudicial techniques to invalidate a challenged restriction, although
generally this standard involves a sliding scale of review corresponding to the gravity of
the discrimination. See generally San Antonio Indep. School Dist., 411 U.S. at 70 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
54. See Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979), rehearing en banc denied,
617 F.2d 750, cert denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980).
55. Mary McGowan, Narenji v. Civiletti: Equal Protection and the Iranian Crisis, 31
CATH. U.L.REv. 101, 108 (1981).
56. With its atmosphere of permanent crisis and flashes of ethnic hostility, the
Iranian hostage affair provided another instance of executive action that threatened to
invade individual constitutional liberties. The immigration crackdown against Iranian
students illustrates the dangers posed by executive action during a period of height-
ened emotion. On November 13, 1979, shortly after American Embassy personnel were
taken hostage in Tehran, Attorney General, Benjamin Civiletti, issued a regulation re-
quiring university students of Iranian nationality to submit special proof of their contin-
2003]
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In The Japanese Restriction Cases,5 7 the Supreme Court established a
heightened standard of review for laws discriminating on the basis of
national origin. 58 In Korematsu v. United States, the Court abandoned
the rational basis test for ancestral classifications. 59 The Court held
that the exclusion order was constitutional because the war with Japan
produced an "apprehension ... of the gravest imminent danger to the
public safety."'6
0
In contrast to the strict standard of review compelled by national
origin discrimination in equal protection analysis, discrimination
against aliens triggers heightened review only when a state classifica-
tion is involved. 61 Time after time, the Supreme Court has deferred to
ued eligibility for student visa status; failure to comply would subject the students to
deportation. The regulation was ostensibly intended to exert diplomatic pressure on
the Iranian government. In Narenji, the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the regula-
tion against a challenge based on the equal protection component of the fifth amend-
ment's due process clause. Narenji, 617 F.2d at 745. The regulation in Narenji raised
serious problems because no explicit congressional authorization existed for special
enforcement action against aliens of a specified nationality. The Attorney General as-
serted authority under a general provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act that
directed him to administer and enforce the Act and to establish such regulations and
perform such other acts, as he deems necessary for carrying out his authority under the
Act. Id.
The District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district court in an opinion that con-
ceded a broad scope to presidential authority in the area of immigration. The court
found that the executive action was adequately authorized by the general statutory
grants of enforcement power to the Attorney General. The court also found that the
regulation did not violate due process because distinctions based on nationality may be
drawn in the immigration field by the Congress or the Executive, so long as such dis-
tinctions are not wholly irrational they must be sustained. In finding that the regulation
had a rational basis, the court extended substantial deference to presidential fact-find-
ing abilities and conceded a measure of inherent presidential authority in this area.
Peter E. Quint, The Separation of Powers Under Carter, 62 TEx.L.REv. 785, 853-56 (1984).
57. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 214; Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81
(1943).
58. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 214; Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 320.
59. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 214. The Court sustained the wartime exclusion of per-
sons of Japanese ancestry from designated West Coast military areas. However, the
court declared that:
It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail the
rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say
that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must
subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may some-
times justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can.
Id.
60. Id. at 218.
61. See Graham, 403 U.S. at 365.
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the federal government when reviewing federal alienage classifications,
requiring only a rational basis for such restrictions. 6 2 In cases involving
discrimination against illegitimates, 63 membership in political par-
ties,6 4 and rights of American citizens to the free exchange of political
views, 65 the Court has declined to review alienage distinctions made by
the political branches of the federal government. This relaxed analysis
has prevailed since 1889, when the Supreme Court decided The Chinese
Exclusion Case.6 6
The Chinese Exclusion case clearly established Congress's plenary
power to exclude aliens from the United States.6 7 Fong Yue Ting v. U.S.
augmented that power with the power of deportation. 6 8 Nishimura Ekiu
v. U.S. tolerated an act of Congress for the exclusion of aliens.69 The
Court followed the rationale that the United States as a sovereign and
62. See Mathews, 426 U.S. at 67.
63. See Fialo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
64. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
65. See Kliendienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
66. THOMAS A. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND PoL-
icy 198 (West Publishing Co., 4th ed. 1998) (discussing Chae Chan Ping v. United
States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889), the Chinese Exclusion Case). The Court upheld the right of
Congress to deny reentry to a Chinese laborer temporarily out of the United States.
This case answered the question whether Congress could exclude aliens from the
United States. The Chinese exclusion laws not only prevented new Chinese laborers
from entering the United States, but also prohibited the return of Chinese who had
been residents of the United States and had left with certificates valid under the 1882
and 1884 laws. Id.
67. Id.
68. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). A 6-3 majority declared
that aliens remained "subject to the power of Congress to expel them, or to order them
to be removed and deported from the country whenever in its judgment their removal
is necessary or expedient for the public interest" and "the power to exclude aliens and
the power to expel them rest upon one foundation, are derived from one source, are
supported by the same reasons, and are in truth but parts of one and the same power."
Id. at 713-714.
69. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651 (1892). The Court, in sus-
taining the action of the executive department, putting in force an act of congress for
the exclusion of aliens, said:
It is an accepted maxim of international law that every sovereign na-
tion has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preserva-
tion, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit
them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to pre-
scribe. In the United States this power is vested in the national government,
to which the constitution has committed the entire control of international
relations, in peace as well as in war. It belongs to the political department of
the government, and may be exercised either through treaties made by the
President and Senate or through statutes enacted by Congress. Id.
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independent nation is vested by the Constitution with the entire con-
trol of international relations, along with all the powers necessary to
maintain that control, and to make it effective. 70 Pursuant to the Con-
stitution, there has developed an elaborate body of immigration law
which gives Congress practically unlimited authority to decide who
may enter the United States and under what conditions they may
remain.7 t
III. FERPA SHOULD APPLY To FOREIGN STUDENTS BECAUSE
IMPLEMENTATION OF SEVIS Is BAD POLICY AND WILL NOT
STOP TERRORISM
The implementation of INS monitoring program, SEVIS, violates
the rights of foreign students and is not an effective tool in the battle
against terrorism. 72 The implementation of SEVIS is expanding the
INS's powers, not merely automating the current process of collecting
student and exchange visitor data. 73 The SEVIS program is not uncon-
stitutional, but is in contradiction with FERPA and singles out foreign
students for anti-terrorism measures. 74
70. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (stating "[tihe Congress shall have the power to
establish a uniform rule of naturalization"); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (stating
" [t]he migration or importation of such persons as any of the States now existing shall
think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year one
thousand eight hundred and eight").
71. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
72. See Editorial, Foreign Students Boost National Security; Keeping Our Universities
Open to the World is Vital to Winning Hearts and Minds, PrTTSBURGH PosT-GAZE-IrE, Jan. 9,
2002, at All.
73. See SEVP, supra note 22 (demonstrating the mandates of section 641 (c) of
IIRIRA).
74. Pursuant to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232(g) (1974):
(a) (1) (A) No funds shall be made available under any applicable program
to any educational agency or institution which has a policy of denying, or
which effectively prevents, the parents of students who are or have been in
attendance at a school of such agency or at such institution, as the case may
be, the right to inspect and review the education records of their children.
When a student turns 18 or enters college, the rights under FERPA transfer
to the student.
(a) (3) For the purposes of this section the term "educational agency or
institution" means any public or private agency or institution which is the
recipient of funds under any applicable program.
(a) (4) (A) For the purposes of this section, the term "education records"
means, those records, files, documents, and other materials which - (i)
contain information directly related to a student; and (ii) are maintained
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A. FERPA Protects Foreign Students
FERPA, also known as the Buckley Amendment, is a federal law
designed to protect the privacy interests of students with respect to
educational records that contain information about individual stu-
dents. 75 FERPA requires that any school or institution that receives fed-
eral funds for education may not release school records or any other
personally identifiable information without the prior consent of the
student.7 6 FERPA does not differentiate between the medium of stor-
age or the method of transmission. 77 There is no legal difference be-
tween the level of protection afforded to physical files over those that
are stored or transmitted electronically or any other form. 78 There-
fore, the education records that can be transmitted through SEVIS are
covered by FERPA.
by an educational agency or institution or by a person acting for such
agency or institution.
(a) (5) (A) For the purposes of this section the term "directory information"
relating to a student includes the following: the student's name, address,
telephone listing, date and place of birth, major field of study, participation
in officially recognized activities and sports, weight and height of members
of athletic teams, dates of attendance, degrees and awards received, and the
most recent previous educational agency or institution attended by the
student.
(a) (6) For the purposes of this section, the term "student" includes any
person with respect to whom an educational agency or institution main-
tains education records or personally identifiable information, but does not
include a person who has not been in attendance at such agency or
institution.
(b) (4B) With respect to this subsection, personal information shall only be
transferred to a third party on the condition that such party will not permit
any other party to have access to such information.
(b) (5) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit State and local
educational officials from having access to student or other records which
may be necessary in connection with the audit and evaluation of any Feder-
ally or State supported education program or in connection with the en-
forcement of the Federal legal requirements which relate to any such
program.
75. See generally Lynn M. Daggett, Bucking Up Buckley I. Making the Federal Student
Records Statute Work, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 617, 620-22 (1997).
76. See FERPA, 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (outlining the requirements of the act).
77. See David A. Banisar, Privacy of Educational Records (Jan. 1994), at http://
www.epic.org/privacy/education/school.html (illustrating that the FERPA does not dif-
ferentiate between electronic and physical files).
78. See id.
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FERPA was enacted "to protect such individuals' rights to privacy
by limiting the transferability of their records without their consent.
79
However, the INS has taken the position that "laws that protect stu-
dents' privacy do not apply to international students."80 This position
is not supported in the language of FERPA.8 1 Even though FERPA
does not mention foreign students, it does not exclude them and it is
not limited to students who are U.S. nationals or permanent re-
sidents. 8 2 International students have limited privacy rights under
FERPA, however, more intrusive laws will create programs that would
provide governmental agencies with background information without
forcing the United States Attorney General to obtain a subpoena, as
was previously required to release student information. 83
FERPA was adopted "after some discussion on the floor, but with-
out public hearings or committee study and reports. '84 Congress of-
fered no opportunity to those affected by the Act to be heard on the
merits of FERPA prior to its enactment. 85 Although there is no full
legislative history for FERPA, one informative piece of legislative his-
tory, referred to as the Joint Statement in Explanation of Buckley/Pell
Amendment 86 ('Joint Statement") provides significant insight into the
intent behind the Act. The Joint Statement begins with the purpose of
the Act, which is to "protect individuals' right to privacy by limiting the
transferability of their records without their consent."8 7 The statement
continues with "an individual has a right of privacy to information that
an institution keeps on him, particularly when the institution may
make important decisions affecting his future, or may transmit such
personal information to parties outside the institution. "
88
79. See Daggett, supra note 75.
80. See Eyleen Schmidt, INS spokeswoman, quoted in Sarah McClellan, International
Students Past Subject of INS Searches, TEXAS CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY WIRE, Oct. 26, 2001.
81. See FERPA, 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g).
82. See id. at (g) (a) (6) (stating "[t]he term student includes any person with re-
spect to whom an educational agency or institution maintains education records or
personally identifiable information, but does not include a person who has not been in
attendance at such agency or institution").
83. See Schmidt, supra note 80.
84. See Daggett, supra note 75, at 620.
85. See Page Johnson, Managing Student Records: The Courts and the Family Educa-
tional Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 79 ED. L. REP. 2 (1993).
86. 120 CONG. REC. 39,862 (Dec. 13, 1974) (statement of Sen. Buckley and Sen.
Pell).
87. Id.
88. Id.
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In the Higher Education Act of 1992, FERPA was amended to cre-
ate an exception for records collected by a law enforcement unit for
"law enforcement purposes."89 Records falling under this provision are
therefore, not subject to the requirements of FERPA.90 Unfortunately,
the only way that foreign students' records, through SEVIS, will fit into
the law enforcement purposes exception is if the INS begins to target
foreign students as potential terrorists. 91 The INS is doing precisely
that by implementing SEVIS.92 The number of foreign students is very
small when compared with the total number of non-immigrant aliens
who cross the United States borders each year.9 3 Foreign students re-
present only 1.8 percent of the 31 million non-immigrant aliens who
obtained visas and entered the United States in 1999. 9 4 They also re-
present only a small portion - about 3.5% - of the total United States
higher education enrollment.95 Yet, the INS is targeting the foreign
student community as potential terrorists because one of the hijackers
of the September 11th attacks entered the U.S. on a student visa. 96
The foreign students are entitled to rights under FERPA as they
are practically the same as United States students. They attend the
same schools, sit in the same classes, and even pay higher tuition than
American students. 97 They are entitled to the same rights and should
not be labeled as potential terrorists. 98 The foreign students have "edu-
cational records" and these records need to be protected by FERPA.99
Contrary to the legislative intent of FERPA, the government, by imple-
89. See Higher Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325, tit. XV, pt.
H, § 1555(a), 106 Stat. 448 (1992) (to be codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a) (4) (B) (ii)).
90. See id.
91. See Anne E. Kornblut, Proposed U.S. Watch On Foreign Students Sparks Controversy,
THE BOSTON GLOBE, June 6, 2000, at Al.
92. See id.
93. See 1999 Statistical Yearbook of the INS, at http://www.ins.gov/graphics/
aboutins/statistics/99yrtemp.htm (providing the most recent available data from the
INS).
94. See id.
95. See Higher Education and National Affairs American Council on Education,
Attacks Raise New Concerns About Foreign Student Visas (Sept. 24, 2001), at http://
www.acenet.edu/hena/issues/2001/09-24-01 /foreign.students.cfm (discussing the per-
centage of foreign students).
96. See Hanjour, supra note 8; see also Schmemann, supra note 1.
97. See Editorial, Foreign Students are Valuable, THE DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Jan. 30,
2002.
98. See Kornblut, supra note 91.
99. See FERPA, 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g).
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menting SEVIS, is not giving foreign students the choice to reveal their
records to a third party."0 '
Because students' information will be automatically entered into
the SEVIS database at the time they apply for a student visa, foreign
students will not have control over the access to their information.
10 1
However, according to FERPA, educational information cannot be
transferred to a third party without express permission from the stu-
dent.10 2 However, because of SEVIS, foreign students do not have to
give permission to access their information, because information is
taken from them as soon as they are approved to attend a school in the
United States.' 0 3 Furthermore, the supply of information does not end
with the application process.10 4 When the students arrive in the United
States their information and private records will continue to be ac-
cessed by the INS. 10 5 By allowing this practice, the government is ex-
pressly classifying foreign students as potential and/or suspected
terrorists.10 6
B. SEVIS Is Not an Effective Tool for Fighting Terrorism
By allowing the implementation of SEVIS, Congress is "overreach-
ing," by expanding the power of the INS. 10 7 SEVIS will also monitor
the students' activity on campus, from criminal activity to major fields
of study.' 0 8 Furthermore, the system will also monitor any changes in
majors and "red flag" certain courses of study, such as nuclear phys-
ics. 10 9 If a foreign student enrolls to pursue a literature degree and
100. 120 CONG. REC. 39,862.
101. See Valarie H. McPherson, Ramifications of New Anti-Terror Law, NEW JERSEY
LAWYER, THE LAW AND MORE, Dec. 10, 2001, at 7.
102. See FERPA, 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g).
103. See McPherson, supra note 101. After applying and being accepted to a U.S.
school, "the educational institution sends a Form 1-120 to the student, which the stu-
dent presents at a U.S. embassy or consulate for a visa." See id. SEVIS implements a
tracking system of students once they have been approved for a visa, prior to entering
the U.S. See id.
104. See Letter to the Editor, Keeping Tabs on Foreign Students, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4,
2002, at A22.
105. See id.
106. See Kornblut, supra note 91.
107. See Letter to the Editor, supra note 104.
108. See Prazuch, supra note 15 (illustrating the government's desire to track stu-
dents as long as they continue to study in the United States).
109. See Scientific Freedom & Nat'l Security, supra note 28 (explaining how SEVIS will
monitor certain major fields of study).
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then switches their major to nuclear physics, the move will be moni-
tored by the school as well as immigration officials. 10 SEVIS should be
limited to that information which is relevant to the INS; it should be
used only to confirm that the student is still attending school."'I The
SEVIS program is excessively intrusive and the INS is not using the
program to provide a service to the schools, as mandated by section
641(c) of IIRIRA, but to track terrorists.' 1 2
INS is not an agency that tracks terrorists and this power should
not be delegated to them.' 3 Currently, schools are required to pro-
vide INS with the "current academic status" of a student, a definition
that hinges on whether the student is attending school full time.
114
The INS will redefine that term to include which major field of study
the student is enrolled in." 5 None of the acts mandate that institutions
provide INS with the major of the students or provide the INS with the
new major that the student changes to. 1 6 The system that was intro-
duced to automate the reporting process is being used as a tool to
invade the privacy of foreign students, by accessing their information
without consent and labeling them as potential terrorists. 1 7 The gov-
ernment needs to stop placing additional burdens on foreign students,
as they try to improve their lives through education.' 18 The govern-
ment needs to address the problems of inefficient administration in-
stead of implementing solutions that will not combat terrorism.
There is a need for better administrative procedures and monitor-
ing of international students studying in the United States, and imple-
menting SEVIS would do little to reduce terrorism and ensure national
security. 119 It would be like looking for a "needle in a haystack. " 120 To
110. See Scientific Freedom & Nat ' Security, The National Commission on Terrorism Report:
Impact on Foreign Students and Minorities, at http://www.aaas.org/spp/scifree/
agenda.htm.
111. See Ka Leo, Electronic Tracking of Foreign Students a Cause for Concern, HAWAII
UNivRsrrV WIRE, Mar. 8, 2002.
112. See Scientific Freedom & Nat '7 Security, supra note 28.
113. See Scientific Freedom & Nat ' Security, supra note 28.
114. See 8 C.F.R. § 21 4 .3 (g)(2) (defining "current academic status and indicating
current reporting procedures required by the INS).
115. See Kornblut, supra note 91.
116. See Kornblut, supra note 91.
117. See Kornblut, supra note 91.
118. See Tracking Int 'l Students, supra note 9.
119. See Editorial, supra note 72.
120. Michael Hedges, Delays Hurt Foreign-Student Tracking; System Meant to Find Those
Misusing was Stalled by Group of Senators, THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Oct. 7, 2001, at A16.
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focus so much attention on such a small minority of nonimmigrants in
the country will do little to improve national security. 1 21 There is no
reason to single out foreign students, who are already closely moni-
tored by the universities, when millions of people illegally enter the
United States each year. 122 Monitoring the students will not help na-
tional security, as the SEVIS system requires documenting a foreign
student as long as he/she is enrolled, and not after he/she graduates
or drops out.123 To monitor students outside the institutional bounda-
ries will require a tremendous task force and the INS lacks the person-
nel to accomplish this. 124 INS currently has fewer than 5,000 inspectors
to evaluate people at ports of entry and only about 2,000 intelligence
officers to find people who overstay their visas or break the law while in
the United States.125 It will be very hard to monitor foreign students
because the agents are "focused in a lot of different directions." 12
6
Even in big cities, the immigration service typically assigns only one
person to work on visas with colleges and myriad other schools offering
subjects like computer, language, and flight training.' 2 7 Catching im-
migrants who overstay their visas has been a "very very low priority and
it should be a low priority."128
In March of 2002, a bureaucratic blunder made the INS a laugh-
ingstock, showcasing the agency's weakness at a time when it already
was under severe criticism after the September l1th attacks. 129 The
INS approved student visas for the September 11th terrorists to study
at Huffman Aviation, before their terrorist associations came to
light.13 0 On March 11, 2002, exactly six months after the terrorist at-
tacks in New York and Washington, Huffman received the paperwork
informing the men that their visas had been approved.1 3 1 The mistake
121. See Editorial, supra note 72.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See Zernike & Drew, supra note 45.
125. See Peddie & Laikin, supra note 47 (illustrating the lack of personnel in the
INS' task force).
126. See Zernike & Drew, supra note 45.
127. See id.
128. See Jack Kelly, Bureaucracy, Complacency Aided Plotters, PITTSBURGH POsT GA-
zE-rrE, Sept. 30, 2001, at A18 (quoting Doris Meissner, INS commissioner during the
Clinton administration).
129. See Tamara Lytle, Congress Lambastes INS Chief" The Commissioner Answered for the
Dead Terrorists' Visas, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 20, 2002, at Al.
130. See id.
131. See id.
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was another embarrassing gaffe for an agency that has long been criti-
cized in Congress for sloppy management and inept record keeping
and for being unable to control the borders or keep track of foreigners
in the U.S. legally or illegally.1 3 2 "This shows the complete incompe-
tence of the INS to enforce our laws and protect our borders." i3 3 "This
kind of thing happens all the time to people who aren't terrorists, but
then it's not news. The very fact that this falls through the cracks tells
you that they do not really own their own data, or have much control
over what happens to it."'
34
INS officials have little grasp of the foreign student population,
including how many are taking classes illegally or out of status.1 35 Em-
barrassed by issuing visas to dead hijackers, the agency is struggling to
prove it can reliably track anyone.' 3 6 However, the INS has also failed
to keep track of schools authorized to accept foreign students.'13 7 Al-
though INS is supposed to review the schools every two years, the au-
thorized list contains institutions that dissolved years ago, in one case,
more than a decade ago.138 As a result of these "blunders," President
Bush will likely accept a proposal from his domestic defense advisers to
merge parts of the embattled INS and the Customs Service into a new
agency that would exert firmer control over who and what enters the
country. 1
39
These problems must be addressed at its roots, before students
come to the United States. Each United States consulate sets its own
interview policies and procedures for issuing student visas, prompting
the practice of "consulate shopping" for less stringent application pro-
132. See David Johnston, A Nation Challenged: The Hijackers; 6 Months Late, LN.S.
Notifies Flight School of Hijackers' Visas, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2002, at A16.
133. See Rodney Crouther, 'We Did it Right, Six Months After the Sept. 11 attacks, a
Venice Flight School Where 2 Hijackers Trained Received Their INS Student Visa Approval Forms,
Providing the School Did Everything it Was Supposed To, SARASOTA HERALD TRIBUNE, Mar.
13, 2002, at Al (quoting Rep. James Sensenbrenner).
134. See Eggen & Thompson, supra note 25 (quoting Mark Krikorian, executive
director of the Center for Immigration Studies).
135. See Eggen & Thompson, supra note 25.
136. See Abraham McLaughlin, INS Reaches for High-Tech Silver Bullet, CHRISTIAN SCI-
ENCE MONITOR, Mar. 18, 2002, at 2.
137. See Robert Becker & Ray Gibson, INS Student Visa System in Disarray; U.S. Loses
Track of Schools; Some No Longer Exist, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 17, 2002, at IC.
138. See id.
139. See David E. Sanger & Eric Schmitt, A Nation Challenged; The Borders; Bush Leans
Toward New Agency to Control Who and What Enters, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2002, at Al.
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cedures.140 The U.S. must require a uniform standard level of investi-
gation. 41 Furthermore, not every consulate even requires a potentially
revealing interview.1 42 Moderately selective schools are typically more
curious when screening domestic applicants and they, unlike the con-
sulates, do not bear the same core function of ensuring national secur-
ity. 14 3 Even if applicants are granted a visa, it does not ensure entrance
to the United States.1 4 4 At the border, the INS can still deny admit-
tance. 145 However, this should not be the last line of defense. The INS
needs to be in contact with the consulates and see whom they may
want to exclude from the country.146
There is no way the United States can construct a system through
which no terrorist could slip into and continue to remain a free soci-
ety. The FBI already has all the authority they need to follow people
with criminal intent. 14 7 Adding the additional burden of tracking every
foreign student in the United States is running a significant risk of civil
liberties infringements.' 48 The government can violate the rights of
foreigners, and have done so throughout history, in the interests of
national security. 149 This is hardly one of those situations. The govern-
ment might as well start monitoring domestic students as we do have
domestic terrorists who we have schooled.' 50
What will implementing SEVIS accomplish besides deterring for-
eign students from attending institutions in the United States? The
INS lacks the personnel to track suspected terrorists in the United
States. ' 5' Immigration officials said that it was unclear if they would be
able to hire more enforcement agents. 152 The extra resources that INS
has received in recent years has gone toward tightening the Mexican
140. See Christopher C. Horner, Outside View: Student Visa Re-Education, UNITED
PRESS INT'L, Nov. 9, 2001.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See Christopher C. Horner, Outside View: Student Visa Re-Education, UNITED
PRESS INT'L, Nov. 9, 2001.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See supra notes 52-66 and accompanying text.
150. See Fumento, supra note 2, and accompanying text.
151. See Zernike & Drew, supra note 45.
152. See Kate Zernike & Christopher Drew, A Nation Challenged: Student Visas; Efforts
to Track Foreign Students are Said to Lag, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2002, at Al.
[Vol. 22
FOREIGN STUDENTS v NATIONAL SECURITY
border.1 53 Even if a terrorist is coming to the United States on a stu-
dent visa, he or she will not appear on any of INS' "lists." 154 That is why
the September 11 th terrorists were able to make it into the country.1
55
Terrorists come in under false names, passports, and visas which make
it almost impossible to stop them at the border. 156 INS commissioner,
James Ziglar, agrees that SEVIS will not make U.S. safe and free of
terrorism. 157 Senator Orrin Hatch added that "change in the way we
conduct our immigration business will not, by itself, prevent terrorist
attacks from occurring." 158 That is why we need to improve our consul-
ates because it is a lot harder to track terrorists once they do make it
into the United States. 159
C. Lack of Constitutional Support
The aforementioned policy arguments are the only arguments
that can be made against the implementation of SEVIS, as infringe-
ment of privacy arguments cannot label SEVIS unconstitutional. Rich-
ard S. Murphy defines privacy as the "control of information
concerning an individual person."'160 Pursuant to Whalen v. Roe, the
Constitution does not afford protection for the control over informa-
tion. 16 1 In an era of computer data banks, the existence and scope of
this right is of obvious importance.1 62 However, thus far the Court has
rarely addressed the issue directly. 16 3
In Whalen, the Court treated privacy as a more expansive right,
one not only protecting autonomy in making intimate decisions but
153. See id.
154. See Tracking Int'l Students, supra note 9 (explaining how terrorists will never
show up on any "suspected terrorist list").
155. See Tracking Int'l Students, supra note 9.
156. See id.
157. See Schultz, supra note 18 (stating "[t]here is no quick fix, technological or
otherwise, to the problems we face").
158. See Evan P. Schultz, Is Open Immigration Now Part of Our Past?, LEGAL TIMES,
Nov. 12, 2001, at 50.
159. See id.
160. See generally Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Eco-
nomic Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381 (1996).
161. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
162. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 806 (Aspen Publishers, Inc. 2001).
163. Although the Supreme Court has not yet used the right to privacy under the
Due Process Clause to provide a right to control information, other constitutional pro-
visions are relevant. For example, the Fourth Amendment limits the ability of the gov-
ernment to gather information about individuals, generally requiring a warrant based
on probable cause before a person can be searched. Id.
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also the "interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters."1 64 The
Court in Whalen held that New York's collection and storage of drug-
prescription data, including the names and addresses of patients re-
ceiving drugs with a high potential for abuse, 165 did not threaten ei-
ther confidentiality or autonomy. 166 The Court reasoned that the
statutory safeguards to prevent dissemination of the potentially damag-
ing information to the public adequately protected the individual's in-
terest in nondisclosure.1 67 The Court deemed disclosure by the
patients to the state an essential part of modern medical practice and
thus, not an impermissible invasion of privacy. 168 The Whalen opinion
suggests that the government's duty to avoid public disclosure of per-
sonal infonnation it stores may be rooted in the Constitution, 169 but
statutory safeguards against public disclosure 70 permitted the Court to
decline to determine the constitutionality of government publication
of personal information.
1 71
Therefore, pursuant to Whalen, the scheme set forth in SEVIS is
constitutional. However, the Court did not reject the possibility that
the right to privacy might be recognized in the future to include a
right to control information. 1 72 Anomalously, the Court concluded its
164. 429 U.S. at 599-600.
165. In Whalen v. Roe, doctors and patients challenged the constitutionality of the
New York State Controlled Substance Act of 1972, N.Y. Pub. Health L. §§ 3300-3396, on
grounds that its requiring computer storage of prescription data (including the identifi-
cation of patient, physician, pharmacist, drug, and dosage) impaired patient's rights to
make private decisions autonomously ad to keep personal information confidential. 429
U.S. at 599-600.
166. Id. at 600.
167. Id. at 600-02. The Court also reasoned that because the state did not entirely
prohibit the use of Schedule II drugs nor condition access to them on consent of third
parties, the individual was not deprived of the right to decide, with the advice of a
physician, to use the medication. Id. at 603.
168. Id. at 602.
169. Id. at 605. The Court equated the constitutionally protected "interest in avoid-
ing disclosure of private matters" with "the right of an individual not to have his private
affairs made public by the government." Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599. The Court also ac-
knowledged that the government's duty to avoid unwarranted disclosure of personal
information in some circumstances "arguably has its roots in the Constitution." Id. at
605.
170. Id. at 593-95. The computer tapes are kept in a locked cabinet; when the tapes
are in use, no terminals outside the computer room can read the information; and
public disclosure of patients' identifies is prohibited by the statute. Id. at 593-94.
171. Id. at 605-06.
172. Id.
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opinion with a "word about issues we have not decided." 173 SEVIS re-
quires an unwarranted disclosure of information and in Whalen, the
Court declined to address the constitutionality of unwarranted disclo-
sure. 174 The Court found that the statute adequately protects confiden-
tiality and declined to decide issues that unwarranted disclosure might
raise. 75 In doing so, the Court seemed to eviscerate its prior recogni-
tion of a right to nondisclosure. The Court noted that the govern-
ment's duty to keep information private was only "arguably"
constitutional.176 Thus, the Court took away with one hand what it had
already given with the other.177 Therefore, although there is a strong
argument that the Constitution should be interpreted to protect a
right to control information, making SEVIS unconstitutional, there is
far little support for such a right from the Supreme Court. 178
Aside from the privacy issue, SEVIS would also be found to be
constitutional based on the lack of "academic freedom" afforded to the
universities by the First Amendment. 179 In Bakke, Allan Bakke was
ejected twice for admission to the Medical College of the University of
California at Davis.' 80 Bakke, a white male, challenged the two-track
admissions program, 18 1 which he claimed violated his rights under the
173. Walen, 429 U.S. at 605.
174. Id at 605-06.
175. "We therefore need not, and do not, decide any question which might be
presented by the unwarranted disclosure of accumulated private data - whether inten-
tional or unintentional - or by a system that did not contain comparable security provi-
sions." Id. (opinion of Stevens, J.).
176. Id. at 605.
177. See Bruce E. Falby, A Constitutional Right to Avoid Disclosure of Personal Matter;
Perfecting Privacy analysis inJP. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080 (6th Cir. 1981), 71 GEo. L.J.
219, 229 (1982).
178. CHEMERINSEY, supra note 162, at 808-9.
179. Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (stating
"academic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated constitutional right, long has
been viewed as a special concern of the Fist Amendment").
180. Id. at 276.
181. Bakke applied to medical school in 1973 and 1974. Id. At issue was the medical
school's two-track admissions program which had a general admissions program and a
special admissions program. Id at 272. The special admissions program was directed at
minorities and was designed to "increase the representation of 'disadvantaged' students
in each medical school class." Id at 272-73. Sixteen out of one hundred places in the
entry class were reserved for minorities in the special admissions program. Id at 275.
Unlike candidates in the general admissions program, candidates in the special admis-
sions program did not have to meet the 2.5 grade point average cut-off, nor were they
ever compared to candidates in the general admissions program. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 275.
In each of the two years that Bakke was rejected, applicants in the special admissions
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Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by excluding
him based on his race.'182
Justice Powell, writing for the plurality, cast the swing vote in
Bakke.183 He concluded that the medical school's special admissions
program could not be upheld. 1 84 While applying strict scrutiny to an
affirmative action program in higher education, Justice Powell found
in Bakke that diversity was a compelling state interest that justified ra-
cial classification. Powell wrote that the attainment of a diverse student
body "clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of
higher education."' 85 In doing so, the Court invoked the four essential
freedoms of "academic freedom," which "though not a specifically enu-
merated constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special concern
of the First Amendment."1 86 These four essential freedoms include the
freedom "to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach,
what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted
to study."18 7 Because the medical school "invoked a countervailing
constitutional interest, that of the First Amendment[,] ... [it] must be
viewed as seeking to achieve a goal that is of paramount importance in
the fulfillment of its mission."' 18 Powell went on to note that the inter-
est in diversity that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a
far broader array of qualifications and characteristics, of which racial
or ethnic origin is not a single, though important element. 8 9 Thus,
the right of colleges and universities to select students who will contrib-
ute the most to the robust exchange of ideas is a countervailing consti-
program were admitted with significantly lower grade point averages, MCAT scores, and
benchmark scores than Bakke. Id at 277.
182. Bakke also claimed violations of his rights under the Equal Protection Clause
of the California Constitution and under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id at
278.
183. See Scott L. Olson, The Case Against Affirmative Action in the Admissions Process,
59 U. Prrr. L. REV. 991, 993 (1997) (stating that "[d]espite the lack of a single opinion
in Bakke, Justice Powell's opinion has generally been regarded as the Court's primary
viewpoint.").
184. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320 (opinion of Powell, J.). Justice Powell, however, based
his decision on constitutional grounds. "The fatal flaw in petitioner's preferential pro-
gram is its disregard of individual rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment."
Id.
185. Id. at 311-12.
186. Id. at 312.
187. Id. at 312 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
188. Id.
189. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315.
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tutional interest. Powell stressed, however, the importance of viewing
each student's application individually in order to determine its quality
and quantity of diversity. Therefore, SEVIS will be found to be consti-
tutional because "academic freedom" extends only to the choice of
classroom curriculum, the appointment of faculty, and the freedom to
select a student body that best serves the interests of higher
education. 190
IV. DIvERsrrY IN THE STUDENT BODY-A COMPELLING
GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST
Because SEVIS is not unconstitutional, a statute like FERPA needs
to protect foreign students. Because achieving diversity in an educa-
tional setting is a compelling state interest,1 9 ' there are additional pol-
icy reasons to protect foreign students. By implementing SEVIS, which
will reduce the number of foreign students in the U.S., U.S. students
will be deprived of association with a diverse student body.
In Bakke, Justice Powell determined that the University's only con-
stitutionally permissible goal was the attainment of a diverse student
body. 192 He viewed the attainment of a diverse student body as an aca-
demic decision deserving of judicial deference because it fell within
190. Id. at 312 (citing Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263.
191. Id. at 276.
192. Id. at 311-12. In his biography of Justice Powell, John C. Jeffries, Jr., discusses
the origins of the Bakke opinion and the conflict that led to justice Powell's reconciling
the use of race-based preferences with the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause.
SeeJOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR., AND THE ERA OFJUDICIAL BALANCE
475-76 (Macmillan Library Reference 1994).Jeffries gained insight from Bob Comfort,
Justice Powell's law clerk, who contributed research and insight on the Bakke opinion.
In discussing the constitutional permissibility of diversity as a compelling state interest,
Jeffries notes that [a]s ajustification for minority preferences, Comfort argued, diversity
was better than compensation - better, because more limited. Compensation implied
that all groups hurt in the past could now claim offsetting preferences. Diversity
reached only those who currently remained unrepresented. Diversity cut against affirm-
ative action for Asians or others who had made it on their own. Also, Comfort favored
diversity because of the flexible way that such concerns traditionally had been dealt
with: "When Harvard College receives applications from Idaho farmboys, it does not
establish a separate admissions track for them. It does not insulate them from compari-
son with other applicants and guarantee them a number of safe seats. Instead, it takes
the fact of geographical origin as one factor weighing in the farmboy's favor when he is
compared against all other applicants .. " Race should be handled the same way. Since
race was "simply one ingredient of educational diversity," it was "unnecessary to isolate
racial minorities from comparison with other applicants." This, said Comfort, was the
crucial defect in the Davis program. It was not that Allen Bakke fell short when com-
pared to the minority admittees. "Rather, Bakke was not compared with them at all." Id.
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the University's right of academic freedom. 19 3 Justice Powell noted
that "[t]he freedom of a university to make its own judgments with
regard to education includes the selection of its student body."1 94 As a
result, the Court permitted the University, as a separate autonomous
entity, to rely on countervailing First Amendment guarantees of aca-
demic freedom to protect its right to make admission decisions. 195
Justice Powell cited Keyishian v. Board of Regents' 9 6 for the proposi-
tion that diversity serves an academic interest because "the 'nation's
future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure' to the
ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many peo-
ples."197 Because diversity in higher education is not susceptible to di-
rect proof, courts must rely on the testimony of educators regarding
193. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12.
194. Id. at 312.
195. Id. at 313. For a criticism of this view, see Sheila Foster, Difference and Equality: A
Critical Assessment of the Concept of "Diversity," 1993 Wis. L. REv. 105 (1993). Professor
Foster criticizes Justice Powell's reliance on the First Amendment as justification for the
use of race-based criteria within the context of a "speech paradigm," which she defines
as "whether First Amendment values are sufficiently promoted by the policies to justify
the affirmative inclusion of historically excluded individuals." Id. at 121. She argues that
this framework is flawed because it "ignores the broader equality concerns underlying
the enactment of the policy at issue in that [Bakke] case." Id. at 122. As further explana-
tion for her position, she notes: Powell could find no principled way, under a speech
paradigm, that an institution could value one person's viewpoints or ideas over another
person's viewpoints or ideas. Diversity, under a speech paradigm, is purely forward-
looking in that the exclusive goal is to multiply the variety of viewpoints and ideas
brought into an institutional setting. Unlike the traditional equality paradigm [which is
defined as "whether past inequities, and their present effects, justify affirmative atten-
tion to differences such as race in the distribution of societal benefits and burdens"], a
speech paradigm fails to acknowledge the social context in which differences, and view-
points, exist. Hence, it does not take into account past inequities toward certain differ-
ences, and their present effects on persons possessing those differences, and thus on
their viewpoints. Thus, a speech paradigm cannot justify differential treatment on the
basis of characteristics such as race in distributing scarce social goods. Id. Professor
Foster favors the alternative analysis set forth by the majority opinion in Metro Broadcast-
ing, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), which also used First Amendment principles to
justify the need for diversity. Professor Foster argues: The majority, under the equality
paradigm predominant in its other equal protection cases, retained its focus on histori-
cal inequities, and their present effects, in concluding that diversity was a sufficient
justification for the race-conscious FCC policies at issue. What was clearly of paramount
importance in justifying the FCC policies in Metro Broadcasting was that minority bene-
ficiaries of the policies, and hence their viewpoints, were significantly under-repre-
sented because of historical exclusion of minorities in the broadcasting industry. Foster,
supra, at 195.
196. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1966).
197. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312-13 (quoting Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603).
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the benefits of diversity. Educators have witnessed firsthand the bene-
fits that diverse student bodies bring to their educational institutions
over time. 198 Such individuals are extremely knowledgeable about the
learning process and the complexity of functioning inside and outside
of the classroom. 199
The benefits of such diversity extend to all of the students in the
classroom. Just as minority and underprivileged students can benefit
from learning mainstream ideas and values, those students coming
from an affluent background or those without diverse cultural knowl-
edge can better understand and learn in a diverse environment.20 0 For
those unfamiliar with minority cultures or ideas, diversity provides the
opportunity to interact with and meet those from different back-
grounds and value systems, 20 an experience all the more necessary for
those entering the legal profession. 20 2 Students of all races and back-
grounds benefit from a diverse student population, for the process of
assimilation, rejection, and modification of a wide range of ideas con-
stitutes the very definition of higher education.
20 3
Diversity can mean anything from student body variety in race,
class, gender, culture, physical disability, religion, or age, 20 4 to differ-
ences in mindset and experience. 20 5 While all forms of diversity are
198. See James A. Washburn, Beyond Brown: Evaluating Equality in Higher Education,
43 DUKE L.J. 1115, 1115 (1994) (declaring that integrated schools will better educate all
of America's youth and give minority students wider contacts and greater self-confi-
dence while suppressing the possibility of inferiority complex).
199. See id.
200. See Foster, supra note 195, at 138-39 (explaining the benefits to all viewpoints
from an exchange of diverse ideas).
201. See Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action For Whom?, 47 STAN. L. REV.
855, 862-63 (1995) (presenting a comprehensive explanation of the intellectual and
academic value of diversity for both minorities and other students).
202. See Leslie Yalof Garfield, Squaring Affirmative Action Admissions Policies with Fed-
eralJudicial Guidelines: A Model for the Twenty-First Century, 22J.C. & U.L. 895, 914 (noting
the benefits to "innocent third parties").
203. See Eulis Simien, The Law School Admission Test as a Barrier to Almost Twenty Years
of Affirmative Action, 12 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 359, 369 (discussing the benefits of a di-
verse student body).
204. See Note, An Evidentiary Framework for Diversity As a Compelling Interest in Higher
Education, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1357, 1357 n.5 (1996); see also Robert A. Destro, ABA and
AALS Accreditation: What's "Religious Diversity" Got to Do With It?, 78 MARQ. L. REv. 427,
427-28, 454 (1995) (providing discussion on role of religious diversity in law school
admissions and accreditation).
205. See Frank H. Wu, A Call for Class Action: The Remedy by Richard D. Kahlenberg,
LEGAL TIMES, June 24, 1996, at 78 (book review) (indicating that diversity of viewpoints
is given short shrift in quest for academic diversity).
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beneficial to the educational experience, racial diversity rises to the
level of a compelling interest for several reasons. First, racial diversity
exposes students to new perspectives, cultures and thoughts, allowing
for a "cross-fertilization of ideas" that is necessary for positive and pro-
ductive interpersonal relations in a modern, melting-pot society.
20 6
Second, racial diversity aids in the reduction of the growing disparity in
educational achievement between whites and the nation's ever-grow-
ing minority population.20 7 Third, racial diversity is indivisible from
any type of effective remedial affirmative action program or policy.
20 8
Stated differently, racial diversity in higher education is a compelling
governmental interest because "race, gender, and ethnicity are the
most important issues we face as a society," 20 9 because student body
diversity "has a direct, immediate, and positive .. .impact" on educa-
tion,210 and because society cannot afford an uneducated minority
population. 21' This last premise - that a society has a duty to educate
all its members - is perhaps the most compelling evidence of the ne-
cessity of racial diversity in higher education. 21 2
Politicians have joined the media in failing to inform the public of
the many benefits that international students and scholars bring to the
U.S.; instead they have chosen to lead the public to believe that if the
government would just tighten controls on international student and
206. See Barbara Bader Aldave, Affirmative Action: Reminiscences, Reflections, and Rumi-
nations, 23 S.U. L. REV. 121, 128 (1996) (contending that "those of us who interact with
persons of diverse cultures and backgrounds will be largely immune to the stereotyping
that can poison our attitudes toward each other and our relationships with each
other"); see also Okechukwu Oko, Laboring in the Vineyards of Equality: Promoting Diversity
In Legal Education Through Affirmative Action, 23 S.U. L. REV. 189, 205 (1996) (contend-
ing that student body diversity is desirable for purpose of exchanging views and sharing
ideas).
207. See Note, supra note 204.
208. See Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 571 (W.D. Tex. 1994) (stating that
"without affirmative action, the law school would not be able to achieve ... diversity"),
rev'd, 78 F.3d 932, 946 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996); Cf Stephanie
M. Wildman, Integration in the 1980s: The Dream of Diversity and the Cycle of Exclusion, 64
TUL. L. REV. 1625, 1631-32 (1990) (opining "social privileges are accorded based on
race" and that privileges "will continue to be so allocated, unless members of society act
affirmatively to change that status quo").
209. Roger Abrams, The Threat of Hopwood, N.J. L.J., May 13, 1996, at 31.
210. Id.
211. See Barbara Bader Aldave & Al Kauffman, Our Institutions Should Offer Equal
Opportunity, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 28, 1996, at A41 (addressing consequences of race-
neutral admissions in America).
212. See id.
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scholar visas, "we would be much safer. ' 2 13 "There are a few senators
that feel they need to show they're doing something, and this is an
easy, very visible area."2 14 California Senator Dianne Feinstein sug-
gested, after September l1th, the U.S. should cease granting student
visas for six months. 2 15 She stated, "I have a concern that ... students
came in from terrorist-supporting states as Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Libya,
and Syria."2 16 However, the September 11 th terrorists came from Saudi
Arabia and Egypt.2 1 7 Following Feinstein's logic should students from
those countries be banned too? And why just students? Why not tour-
ists? Business people? All Arabs? All Muslims? All immigrants? This
thinking does not make sense, however, to a worried public it does. 2 18
"What happened on September 11th was not about immigrants or for-
eign students, it was about evil."2 19
A former U.S. Secretary of Education Richard W. Riley wrote,
"[T] hese student ambassadors, who make lasting friendships in
America and better understand our values and way of life, are the fu-
ture world leaders with whom we will sit down to forge alliances
around the globe." 220 Many Americans may be surprised to learn just
how many foreign leaders have been educated in the U.S., among
them: King Abdulah of Jordan; United Nations Secretary General Kofi
Annan, from Ghana; Jacques Chirac, president of France; Vicente Fox,
president of Mexico; Shimon Peres, former prime minister of Israel;
and many others from more than 60 countries around the world.22 1
Advanced industrial countries view foreign student programs as
means of providing economic assistance to less developed regions. 222
Others view foreign students as an economic boon. 223 In fact, tuition
paid by foreign students contributes toward paying for American stu-
213. See Editorial, supra note 72 (describing the one sided description of foreign
students).
214. See Zernike & Drew, supra note 45 (quoting George Beers, Dean of Interna-
tional and Distance Education at Foothill College in Los Altos Hills, California).
215. See Schultz, supra note 18.
216. See id.
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. See id. (quoting INS Commissioner James Ziglar).
220. See id.
221. See id.
222. See Bryan P. Christian, Workshop Report: Transatlantic Workshop on High Skilled
Migration, 14 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 907, 908 (2000)
223. See id.
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dents. 2 2 4 However, in February of 2001, Florida legislature failed to
take note of this fact.2 2 5 Many foreign graduate students serve as re-
search assistants, providing important labor in exchange for part of the
cost of education. 226 Corporations recruit heavily among foreign stu-
dents, and the students themselves become productive and easily as-
similated members of the host society.2 2 7
Educating foreign individuals ensures that current and future
world leaders are exposed to the cultural, political, economic, and ed-
ucational values of America. 22 8 Secretary of State Colin Powell has
stated, "I can think of no more valuable asset to our country than the
friendship of future world leaders who have been educated here. 22 9
The United States must find a way to achieve both the security objec-
tives that ensure the protection of its citizens at home and the open-
ness that assures its strong and effective leadership around the
world. 230 To sacrifice one at the expense of the other would be short-
sighted and detrimental to our nation's strategic position in the world
community.
224. See Editorial, supra note 97.
By law, foreign students are barred from receiving financial aid and loans,
state or federal. Students at an undergraduate level have no means to fund
their education other than personal resources (part-time jobs on campus,
family, foreign governments or private sponsors). Graduate and post-gradu-
ate students can qualify to pay reduced tuition only if they contribute as a
teaching or research assistant. No taxpayer money is ever used to help a
foreign student with his or her education. As a best kept secret in the "edu-
cational industry," universities often go on road-shows overseas to recruit
foreign students. They are a highly sought-after commodity. Why? Foreign
students always pay out-of-state tuition. A figure that local students almost
never bother to look at, out-of-state tuition is usually five times the tuition
paid by in-state students or two times the real cost of that education. The
excess money serves as financial aid for local students. See id.
225. SeeJoe Follick, Florida House Panel Blocks Aid for Alien Students, THE TAMPA TiB-
UNE, Feb. 6, 2002. Saying they are apt to be tools of "terrorists" and "thugs", a House
committee approved a bill that would deny state financial assistance to nonresident
aliens attending Florida schools. However, it is already illegal for nonresident aliens to
receive any financial assistance. See id.
226. See Christian, supra note 222.
227. See id.
228. See Editorial, supra note 72.
229. See id.
230. See Editorial, Foreign Students Boost National Security; Keeping Our Universities
Open to the World is Vital to Winning Hearts and Minds, PrrrsBURGH POsTr-GAzErTE, Jan. 9,
2002, at All.
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V. CONCLUSION
The implementation of SEVIS will reduce the number of foreign-
ers coming to study in the United States. The idea of treating people as
potential terrorists is not welcoming. These students may chose to
study in England or Australia or any other country that wants them.
The National Association of Foreign Student Advisors (NAFSA)
predicts that between 15% and 30% of the English language program
population will choose other English-speaking countries (primarily
Australia, Canada, and England) if SEVIS moves forward. 2 31
The impending SEVIS regulations will have a disastrous effect by
adding complexity to visa regulations and damaging United States'
competitiveness for foreign students. Other countries will gladly take
the $12.3 billion that these students contribute to our economy.23 2
The U.S. needs to act and it needs to act now. However, implementa-
tion of SEVIS will be short-sighted at best. But under no circumstances
should the rights of foreign students be taken away. The U.S. cannot
say no to education and it cannot say no to international understand-
ing. If U.S. allows the September l1th attacks to shut the doors of the
nation to international educational and cultural exchange, it will pay
immeasurably in the loss of friendship, goodwill, and understanding
around the world.23 3 The U.S. must determine our immigration policy
by the Statue of Liberty and not by the ruins of Lower Manhattan. The
continued commitment of the U.S. to support international educa-
tional and cultural exchange is essential in order to secure long-term
victory in the war on terrorism.23 4
David Treyster
231. See Letter to INS, supra note 39.
232. See id.
233. See Editorial, supra note 72.
234. See id.
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